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101 
Note 
 
Incentivizing Access to the WTO’s Dispute 
System for the Least-Developed Countries: Legal 
Flaws in Brazil’s Upland Cotton Decision 
 
Luke Olson 
 
Agriculture is one of the few areas where developing 
countries have an advantage over developed countries due to 
their ability to create the same product at significantly lower 
prices.
1
 Many developed countries, however, provide 
agricultural subsidies to their farmers in order to improve their 
export market and protect farmers against the volatility of crop 
prices, weather fluctuations and other factors.
2
 In an export-
heavy country like the United States, these subsidies often 
have an adverse effect on international markets by essentially 
creating a price guarantee for farmers.
3
 When the government 
subsidizes their losses, farmers often produce despite the 
decreasing demand, where they would otherwise restrict 
production.
4
 Such overproduction floods global markets with 
the subsidized crop drives down food prices and negatively 
affects unsubsidized farmers who have to compete with the 
subsidized farmers.
5
  
Since developing countries are unable to compete on price 
of the crops with developed countries, they are forced to import 
 
    JD candidate, 2014, University of Minnesota Law School. 
 1. See Kevin C. Kennedy, The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural 
Subsidies, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 335, 343 (2007–2008) (comparing 
Western and Central African countries to the U.S. in terms of cost of cotton 
production). 
 2. See generally Matthew C. Porterfield, U.S. Farm Subsidies and the 
Expiration of the WTO’s Peace Clause, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 999 (2006). 
 3. See Elizabeth Bullington, Comment, WTO Agreements Mandate That 
Congress Repeal the Farm Bill of 2002 and Enact an Agriculture Law 
Embodying Free Market Principles, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1211, 1213–16 
(2005) (discussing the negative effects U.S. cotton subsidies have in other 
parts of the world). 
 4. Id. at 1215 (explaining the connection between U.S. subsidies and 
U.S. farmers’ overproduction). 
 5. Id.  
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those crops rather than grow them on their own, nullifying a 
potential trade advantage.
6
 Furthermore, because agriculture 
plays such a significant role in alleviating poverty in developing 
countries
7
, these subsidies are not only an economic issue, but a 
humanitarian one. 
In response to this dilemma, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has attempted to reduce agricultural subsidies and 
introduce free market principles into the global market in order 
to increase global competitiveness.
8
 The U.S., however, has 
resisted these changes.
9
 In 2003, Brazil initiated a suit against 
the U.S., claiming that U.S. cotton subsidies had substantially 
prejudiced Brazil’s cotton industry.
10
 The WTO panel ruled 
largely in Brazil’s favor and allowed it to enact retaliatory 
trade measures against the U.S. until the U.S. aligns its 
domestic policy with WTO requirements.
11
 While trade 
sanctions have had some success in the case of Brazil’s cotton 
industry, it does not provide the same protections to the 
majority of developing countries.
12
 Most developing countries do 
 
 6. See generally Kennedy, supra note 1, at 336–38 (laying out the largest 
exporters of cotton, with the U.S. being the biggest exporter globally). For 
example, in the least-developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, outside Cape 
Verde and Lesotho, agriculture employs a minimum of 50% of the total labor 
force. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 2004, The Least 
Developed Countries Report 2004: Linking International Trade with Poverty 
Reduction, 349, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2004 (May 27, 2004). 
 7. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE LEAST 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES REPORT 2004: LINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH 
POVERTY REDUCTION, at 349, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2004, U.N. Sales No. 
E.04.II.D.27 (2004). 
 8. INFO. AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS DIV., WORLD TRADE ORG., 
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 26–29 (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING 
THE WTO] (providing an overview of the WTO’s mission as it pertains to 
agriculture). 
 9. See KEVIN WATKINS, OXFAM, CULTIVATING POVERTY: THE IMPACT OF 
U.S. COTTON SUBSIDIES ON AFRICA at 1 (2002) (“I told the people, I said if you 
give me a chance to be the President, we’re not going to treat our agricultural 
industry as a secondary citizen when it comes to opening up markets. And I 
mean that . . . . The farm bill is important legislation . . . . It will promote 
farmer independence, and preserve the farm way of life. It helps America’s 
farmers, and therefore it helps America.” (quoting George W. Bush, President, 
Remarks by the President on Signing the Farm Bill (May 13, 2002)). 
 10. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1219 (noting the complaint brought to the 
WTO by Brazil claiming that U.S. cotton subsidies violated the Agreement on 
Agriculture).   
 11. See generally Porterfield, supra note 2, at 1034 (describing Brazil’s 
threats against U.S. intellectual property and services). 
 12. See Bullington, supra note 3, at 1219 (stating that the WTO ruled, in 
large part, on behalf of Brazil). 
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not have a trade sector advanced enough to enact effective 
trade sanctions against the U.S.
13
 Therefore, while WTO 
remedies have improved substantially, they do not provide a 
viable remedy for the majority of developing countries.
14
 
This note seeks to understand the shortcomings of the 
current WTO dispute system and provide recommendations for 
its potential improvement. Part I briefly outlines the history of 
agricultural subsidies, their effect on developing countries, and 
the WTO’s attempt to remedy trade imbalances. Part II 
analyzes the current WTO dispute system and identifies 
several shortcomings in the system while advocating for 
modifications in the dispute system and its remedies. This part 
also analyzes the panel’s recent decision in Brazil’s cotton 
subsidies challenge. This Note concludes that while the WTO 
has substantially improved enforcement of its regulations, this 
improvement insufficiently protects the majority of developing 
countries. Adequate protection requires further modification of 
available remedies. 
 
I. EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ON 
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND THE RESPONSE BY THE 
WTO 
 
A. HISTORY OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 
 
The U.S. has a long history of subsidizing its farmers’ crops 
to provide risk insurance for domestic farmers.
15
 In reaction to 
falling grain prices after World War I, three legislative bills 
granted price subsidies to domestic farmers: the 1922 Grain 
Futures Act, the 1929 Agricultural Marketing Act and the 1933 
Agricultural Adjustment Act.
16
 In these acts, the government 
 
 13. See generally Ousmane Badiane et al., Cotton Sector Strategies in West 
and Central Africa (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/02/173, 
2002) (“The competitiveness of the region’s cotton sector is evidenced by the 
low level of costs when compared to other countries and the strong growth in 
production over the last two decades.”). 
 14. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 346 (describing how sub-Sahara African 
cotton farmers are continually disadvantaged by U.S. agricultural policy). 
 15. Porterfield, supra note 2, at 1002–05 (discussing the expiration of the 
WTO’s peace clause that protected countries against challenges to domestic 
subsidy policy).  
 16. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities 
Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 312–28 (1997) (discussing the history of 
the Grain Futures Act, Agricultural Marketing Act and Agricultural 
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controlled commodity prices and agricultural supply by paying 
farmers to leave land unused during times of low commodity 
prices.
17
 Over time, the U.S. expanded methods of agricultural 
subsidies to include export subsidies, price supports to different 
crops, increased crop insurance, increases in guaranteed 
federal loans and replacement of some price supports with fixed 
payments.
18
 
In the 1990s, the U.S. substantially changed its approach 
to agricultural subsidies in response to growing pressure from 
the international community.
19
 In 1994, Congress ratified the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations, which created the World Trade 
Organization and placed significant restrictions on domestic 
subsidies.
20
 In 1996, Congress passed the Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act, which revised and simplified 
direct payment programs for crops and eliminated milk price 
supports through government purchases in an effort to keep 
subsidies aligned with WTO restrictions.
21
  
However, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act in 
2002 superseded many of these provisions and instituted three 
programs of subsidies for domestic farmers: (1) marketing loan 
program payments; (2) direct payments; and (3) counter-
cyclical payments.
22
 The government provides marketing loan 
subsidies to farmers based on the value of the specific 
commodity during times when market prices are at harvest-
time lows. This allows the producer to delay the sale of the 
commodity until more favorable market conditions emerge.
23
 
Direct payment subsidies are a fixed payment offered to 
qualifying farmers without regard to the economic need of the 
 
Adjustment Act). 
 17. Porterfield, supra note 2, at 1002. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.; see generally WTO Secretariat, Info. & Media Relations Div., WTO 
Agriculture Negotiations – The Issues, and where we are now (Dec. 1, 2004), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd00_ 
contents_e.htm (giving a general overview of agricultural issues discussed in 
the WTO between 2000 and 2004) ). 
 21. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, H.R. 2646, 107th 
Cong., (2002) (providing overview of non-recourse loan program under the 
1996 and 2002 Farm Bills). 
 22. Porterfield, supra note 15, at 1004. 
 23. JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21604, MARKETING LOANS, 
LOAN DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS, AND COMMODITY CERTIFICATES, 2–3 (2004) 
(explaining the market loan program). 
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recipient.
24
 Because the payments are fixed, direct payment 
subsidies are only indirectly related to the global market for 
crops.
25
 Lastly, counter-cyclical subsidies provide additional 
assistance on top of direct payment subsidies during periods of 
low demand or price lows.
26
 In these instances, a farmer 
receives a counter-cyclical subsidy in addition to a direct 
payment subsidy in order to counteract low crop prices.
27
 
Counter-cyclical subsidies significantly rely on the market and, 
therefore, can fluctuate considerably.
28
 
 
B. EFFECT ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
 
Government payments to U.S. farmers are intended to 
provide protection from unsustainable losses due to decreased 
demand or prices.
29
 However, subsidies that encourage 
production without a market for that production tend to cause 
overproduction.
30
 As a result, this surplus floods the domestic 
and international market where the demand is 
disproportionate to the supply, causing a drop in prices. This 
adversely affects farmers in developing countries who produce 
that commodity.
31
 Ironically, such a drop in prices then causes a 
further need to subsidize domestic farmers.
32
 This creates a 
cycle in which subsidized farmers overproduce in the face of a 
market in which they would otherwise restrict production, 
thereby driving down crop prices.
33
 These price drops, 
 
 24. Bullington, supra note 3, 1219–20 (claiming that the 2002 Farm Bill 
violated the United States’s obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture 
in the WTO and suggesting that Congress repeal the Act and pass legislation 
that reduces agricultural subsidies to within WTO regulations).  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1220–22. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 1220. 
 30. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 8, at 26 (explaining the 
effect that trade-distorting policies have on international trade and the 
obstruction they cause in creating an international free market). 
 31. See 148 CONG. REC. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Bunning) (remarking that increased government subsidies provide incentives 
to overproduce and will cause prices to eventually drop due to an oversupply, 
forcing farmers to continue to produce at unsustainable rates); see also 
Bullington, supra note 3, at 1215. 
 32. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1242–43 (explaining how domestic 
subsidies hurt small domestic farms). 
 33. Id. at 1241–43 (explaining that subsidies benefit larger domestic 
farms that receive the most subsidies). 
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consequently, lead to additional subsidies.  
Farmers in developed countries can generally weather 
these price drops, because the government subsidizes a portion 
of their production costs. However, farmers in developing 
countries struggle to compete without the buoy of subsidies.
34
 
Unable to compete with subsidized farmers in developed 
countries, many farmers in developing countries are forced out 
of business.
35
 This causes two adverse effects: (1) since the 
agricultural sector in developing countries accounts for a larger 
part of national gross domestic product
36
, it causes a severe 
adverse effect on developing countries’ economies
37
; and (2) the 
lack of domestic production of crops in developing countries 
necessitates the importation of crops from developed countries. 
This exacerbates the economic dependency of developing 
countries on developed countries.
38
 
Without subsidies, agriculture represents one of the few 
areas in which developing countries have an advantage over 
developed countries. In agriculture, developing countries 
produce essentially the same product at significantly lower 
prices.
39
 For example, cotton production in the U.S. costs 
roughly $0.73/lb,
40
 whereas in Burkina Faso it costs $0.21/lb.
41
 
However, when the U.S. subsidizes cotton farmers and drives 
down the international market price, farmers in Burkina Faso 
 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. (explaining the adverse effects of U.S. farming subsidies on 
developing nations’ economies). 
 36. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 335–36 (“With the exceptions of Cape Verde 
and Lesotho, agriculture employs at a minimum more than 50% of the total 
labor force in all [sub-Saharan African least-developed countries].”). 
 37. Scott D. Andersen & Meredith A. Taylor, Brazil’s WTO Challenge to 
U.S. Cotton Subsidies: The Road to Effective Disciplines of Agricultural 
Subsidies, Bus. L. Brief 2, 4–5 (2009–2010) (discussing the $2.9 billion in price 
suppression that U.S. cotton subsidies created on an annual basis in the 
international cotton market.) 
 38. See generally Kennedy, supra note 1 (illustrating how agricultural 
subsidies not only protect domestic farmers, but increase developing countries’ 
reliance on U.S. exports by using cotton as an example; explaining that the 
U.S., China and India combined produce 50% of the world’s cotton and the 
U.S. exports 70% of its cotton). 
 39. See generally Badiane et al., supra note 13 (“The competitiveness of 
the region’s cotton sector is evidenced by the low level of costs when compared 
to other countries and the strong growth in production over the last two 
decades.”). 
 40. All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars, unless indicated otherwise. 
 41. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 343; see also WATKINS, supra note 9. 
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cannot compete with farmers in the U.S.
42
 A cotton farmer in 
Burkina Faso must then either choose to produce more or find 
a more profitable enterprise.
43
 Agricultural subsidies, therefore, 
create an imbalanced trade system that prejudicially affects 
developing countries.
44
 
 
C. AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES HAVE RECEIVED SIGNIFICANT 
CRITICISM FROM BOTH THE DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY  
 
Agricultural subsidies have received considerable domestic 
and international criticism for their prejudicial effect on 
international crop prices and their consequent impact on the 
agricultural sector of developing countries.
45
 Some members of 
Congress vehemently opposed a proposal to move away from 
agricultural subsidies and slowly towards a more paradigmatic 
free market system.
46
 U.S. criticism centers on the negative 
effects the subsidies will have on the U.S. economy, the 
unsustainability of subsidized farming, and on the political 
ramifications on trade relationships.
47
 In the legislative history 
of the 2002 Farm Bill, Senator Bunning expressed his concerns: 
 
On the one hand, [this bill] raises price supports 
quickly and holds out the possibility of putting a few 
more dollars in their pocket in [the] short run. But, on 
the other hand, I believe all of these extra production 
 
 42. Jay Fabiosa et al., The Doha Round of the World Trade Organization 
and Agricultural Markets Liberalization: Impacts on Developing Economies, 27 
REV. AGRIC. ECON. 317, 318 (2005) (citation omitted) (“Exports from some of 
these countries are subsidized explicitly or implicitly through production 
subsidies and are often “dumped” on world markets. The objective of income 
transfer to domestic farmers is not in question, but rather, the way it is 
accomplished with coupled and untargeted policies. These transfers frustrate 
competitive exporters in developing economies and compromise income 
generation in poor countries, such as in the case of cotton”). 
 43. See Bullington, supra note 3, at 1242 n.123 (citing Trade: Sour 
Subsidies, ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 2004) (referring to the exportation of illegal 
narcotics by developing countries). 
 44. Kennedy, supra note 1 passim. 
 45. See 148 CONG. REC. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Bunning) (expressing concern over the domestic overproduction of crops as a 
result of U.S. farm subsidies); see also Kennedy, supra note 1, at 339–340 
(explaining how ninety developing countries insisted that the issues 
surrounding cotton subsidies be addressed). 
 46. Id. (statement of Sen. Bunning) (“I want a farm bill I can support.”).  
 47. Id.  
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incentives will lead to so much overproduction of crops 
that it will eventually drive commodity prices through 
the floor and cause an income disaster in the long 
run.
48
 
 
Senator Corzine also stated: 
 
These subsidies naturally lead to overproduction 
which distorts the market, unfairly benefits a limited 
number of the largest producers and imposes 
excessive costs on all consumers . . . I am also very 
concerned that the legislation’s large increase in 
commodity subsidies would undermine U.S. trade 
policy . . . .
49
  
 
Despite this opposition, the U.S. has continued its domestic 
policy of using agricultural subsidies to combat price lows and 
demand drop-offs.
50
 
The international community has also criticized U.S. 
agricultural subsidies on the basis that subsidies negatively 
affect the economies of developing countries.
51
 Mark Malloch 
Brown, the former head of the United Nations Development 
Program, stated, “It is the extraordinary distortion of global 
trade, where the West spends $360 billion a year on protecting 
its agriculture with a network of subsidies and tariffs that costs 
 
 48. Id.; see also id. (statement of Sen. McConnell) (“In fact, the commodity 
title essentially tells the farmer that the market doesn’t matter anymore. The 
target prices now become the producer’s price guarantee. This policy will 
encourage over-production which, in turn, will lead to lower prices. This, of 
course, favors larger farms, because the more you produce the more Federal 
payments you receive. The more money you have will also enable you to 
purchase more land to produce even more.”). 
 49. Id. at S4036 (statement of Sen. Corzine) ( “I also am very concerned 
that the legislation’s large increase in commodity subsidies would undermine 
U.S. trade policy and make it much harder to win concession in international 
trade negotiations. That’s because huge U.S. subsidies would drive down 
global crop prices, and adversely affect the economies of many other countries, 
especially developing nations. These nations then would be much less likely to 
open their markets to American companies. The end result would be that 
generous subsidies to a small handful of agribusinesses would end up 
undermining a much broader range of U.S. manufacturers and service 
providers, and would cost American jobs.”). 
 50. Watkins, supra note 9, at 12 (explaining that farmers will receive $.52 
for every pound of cotton under new arrangements). 
 51. Badiane et al., supra note 13, at 1 (claiming that cotton subsidies 
adversely affect developing nations’ attempts to alleviate poverty). 
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developing countries about $50 billion in potential lost 
agricultural exports.”
52
 The WTO has consistently criticized 
domestic support in trade-related matters. It reaffirmed its 
disapproval during the Doha round of negotiations in 2001, 
stating: “Building on the work carried out to date and without 
prejudging the outcome of the negotiations we commit 
ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial 
improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to 
phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial 
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.”
53
 Nonetheless, 
the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 largely 
reaffirmed the use of domestic agricultural subsidies. Subsidies 
could, again, potentially be affirmed under the Agriculture 
Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2012.
54
 
 
D. RESPONSE BY THE WTO  
 
1. Agreement on Agriculture 
 
In 1994, the World Trade Organization signed the 
Agreement on Agriculture [hereinafter Agreement] as part of 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization.
55
 The Agreement’s objective is to “establish a fair 
and market-oriented agricultural trading system and that a 
reform process should be initiated through the negotiation of 
commitments on support and protection . . . .”
56
 In order to 
advance that objective, the WTO sought to cap the amount of 
 
 52. Mark Malloch Brown, Dev. Programme Adm’r, United Nations, The 
Millennium Development Goals and Africa: A New Framework for a New 
Future (Nov. 12, 2002), http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2002/november 
/mmb-uganda.en?src=print (discussing the development goals for Africa of 
poverty reduction, educational development and health reform through the 
means of trade concessions, debt relief and increased development assistance). 
 53. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, at 3 (2001) (re-emphasizing the goals expressed in 
the Uruguay round of trade negotiations and in the Geneva Framework 
regarding reduction of domestic subsidies in order to create market access for 
developing countries). 
 54. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 8701–8793 (2008). 
 55. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter 
Agreement on Agriculture].   
 56. Id. (quoting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions 
Adopted at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 8, 1989, 28 
I.L.M. 1023, 1027).  
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subsidies a nation could annually provide to domestic farmers 
in an effort to limit trade-distorting measures.
57
 “Trade 
distortion occurs in the [international] market when an 
agricultural producer’s level of production or a commodity’s 
price is higher or lower than it would be absent government 
interference.”
58
 Article 6 of the Agreement requires each WTO 
member to refrain from providing agricultural subsidies in any 
given year in excess of the maximum amount specified for that 
state.
59
 The Agreement calls the amount of funds that a 
government actually distributes in trade-distorting subsides 
the Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Current 
Total AMS).
60
 The WTO designated the U.S. maximum at $19.1 
billion per year for trade-distorting, agricultural subsidies.
61
 
The WTO divides subsidies into three different categories, 
termed boxes, ranging from the most trade-distorting subsidies 
to least trade-distorting.
62
 The WTO categorizes the most trade-
distorting subsidies as “amber box” supports.
63
 Amber box 
supports include domestic policies which directly affect 
production and trade.
64
 Blue box supports fall in the middle 
 
 57. Id. (“[r]ecalling further that ‘the. . . long-term objective is to provide 
for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection 
sustained over’ . . . the following areas: market access; domestic support; 
export competition; and to reaching an agreement on sanitary and 
phytosanitary issues;” (quoting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: 
Decisions Adopted at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 8, 
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1023, 1027)). 
 58. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1215; see e.g., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, 
supra note 8, at 26 (“For example, import barriers and domestic subsidies can 
make crops more expensive on a country’s internal market. The higher prices 
can encourage over-production. If the surplus is to be sold on world markets, 
where prices are lower, then export subsidies are needed. As a result, the 
subsidizing countries can be producing and exporting considerably more than 
they normally would.”). 
 59. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 55. 
 60. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1223. 
 61. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 55 (explaining how a country 
must calculate its Current Total AMS); see also Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade 
Representative, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Conference 
with USTR Zoellick at the Conclusion of WTO General Council Meeting (Aug. 
1, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Transcripts/2004/ 
August/Transcript_of_Press_Conference_with_USTR_Zoellick_At_the_Conclus
ion_of_WTO_General_Council_Meeting,_Geneva,_Switzerl.html (specifying 
that the U.S. Allowed Total AMS is roughly $19.1 billion per year).  
 62. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 8, at 28–29. 
 63. See id.  
 64. Id. (“Domestic policies that do have a direct effect on production and 
trade have to be cut back . . . . Developed countries agreed to reduce these 
figures by 20% over six years starting in 1995. Developing countries agreed to 
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category, which provide payments to farmers but require them 
to limit production.
65
 Lastly, green box subsidies have very 
little to no trade-distorting effects.
66
 The Agreement only 
requires states to reduce their amber box subsidies.
67
 Therefore, 
the U.S. needs to reduce its amber box subsidies to $19.1 billion 
or less in order to comply with the Agreement.
68
 
 
2. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures 
 
When the WTO was created, the Member countries 
established a dispute settlement body (DSB) to govern trade 
disputes between countries.
69
 Article 3.2 of the DSU states, 
“[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central 
element in providing security and predictability to the 
 
make 13% cuts over 10 years. Least-developed countries do not need to make 
any cuts. (This category of domestic support is sometimes called the ‘amber 
box’.)”). 
 65. Id. at 29 (“Also permitted, are certain direct payments to farmers 
where the farmers are required to limit production (sometimes called ‘blue box’ 
measures), certain government assistance programmes to encourage 
agricultural and rural development in developing countries, and other support 
on a small scale (‘de minimis’) when compared with the total value of the 
product or products supported (5% or less in the case of developed countries 
and 10% or less for developing countries).”). 
 66. Id. (“Measures with minimal impact on trade can be used freely – they 
are in a ‘green box’ . . . . They include government services such as research, 
disease control, infrastructure and food security. They also include payments 
made directly to farmers that do not stimulate production, such as certain 
forms of direct income support, assistance to help farmers restructure 
agriculture, and direct payments under environmental and regional assistance 
programmes.”); see also World Trade Organization, Agriculture Negotiations: 
Background Fact Sheet, Domestic Support in Agriculture (Oct. 1, 2002), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm (providing an 
overview of the three boxes and how they are defined). 
 67. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1224. 
 68. Id. (footnotes omitted) (“The Agreement on Agriculture does not 
require Member States to reduce the amount of any domestic subsidies except 
for amber box subsidies, which are the only subsidies that count toward a 
Member State’s spending limit. Since the U.S. Allowed Total AMS is $19.1 
billion, the total amount of amber box support the United States may spend is 
also $19.1 billion.”). 
 69. Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 405 (1994), Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
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multilateral trading system.”
70
 Article 3.3 further states that 
“the prompt settlement of situations in which a Member 
considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly 
under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures 
taken by another Member is essential to the effective 
functioning of the WTO.”
71
 By conferring compulsory 
jurisdiction on the DSB to overhear trade disputes, the DSU 
establishes a governing body to ensure the equitable balance of 
domestic and international trade policies.
72
 
The DSU specifically focuses on incorporating the interests 
of developing countries. Article 4.10 of the DSU states that 
Members must “give special attention to the particular 
problems and interests of developing country Members” in the 
consultation process.
73
 The DSU repeatedly notes that 
developing countries should be afforded preferential treatment 
in dispute settlement before the WTO.
74
 The WTO thus has 
addressed the need to rebalance the disparity in economic 
power between developed and developing nations.
75
 
The DSU also instituted harsher remedies for successful 
challenges to prejudicial trade policies in order to achieve 
stricter enforcement.
76
 In the GATT system that preceded the 
DSU, remedies attempted to rebalance trade agreements 
between Member nations.
77
 However, the DSU has instead 
taken a stricter approach by inducing compliance rather than 
rebalancing trade agreements.
78
 WTO case law reaffirms this 
approach in every Article 22.6 report, which always state that 
the purpose of countermeasures, or the suspension of 
 
 70. Id. art. 3.2. 
 71. Id. art. 3.3. 
 72. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 16 (2nd ed. 
2004). 
 73. DSU, supra note 69, at art. 4.10; see also PALMETER & MAVROIDIS , 
supra note 72, at 174. 
 74. See DSU, supra note 69, at arts. 3.12 & 12.10. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See SHERZOD SHADIKHODJAEV, RETALIATION IN THE WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 28 (Ross Buckley, et al. eds., 19th ed. 2009) (“In a 
number of arbitration cases, it was underlined that a ‘key objective’ or ‘one of 
the recognized purposes’ of retaliation is to induce the losing party to comply 
with the DSB recommendation and ruling”). 
 77. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 72, at 301; see also KENNETH W. 
DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 80 
(Chicago, 1970). 
 78. SHADIKHODJAEV, supra note 76, at 28–29. 
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concessions, is to induce compliance, rather than to rebalance 
concessions.
79
 The DSU therefore takes a stronger regulatory 
approach to correcting the economic power gap and to 
encouraging developing countries to take advantage of the 
dispute settlement system.
80
 
Furthermore, the WTO instituted the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures [hereinafter SCM 
Agreement] for further regulation of prejudicial subsidies.
81
 
“The underlying aim of this Agreement is to balance the 
concern that domestic industries should not be put at an unfair 
disadvantage by competition from foreign goods which benefit 
from subsidies, and the concern that countervailing measures 
offsetting those subsidies should not create unnecessary 
barriers to trade.”
82
 Article 27 of the SCM Agreement also lays 
down special rules for developing countries.
83
 The DSU and the 
SCM Agreement seek to create an equitable balance of 
domestic subsidies and market access for developing countries 
and to institute the procedures and remedies required to 
enforce that balance.
84
 
 
E. BRAZIL’S COTTON SUBSIDY CHALLENGE 
 
In 2002, Brazil initiated WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings against the U.S. claiming that the U.S. violated its 
obligations under the SCM agreement. Brazil’s claim included 
the proposition that, by failing to abide by WTO regulations on 
agricultural subsidies, the U.S. caused serious prejudice to 
Brazil’s cotton industry.
85
 Brazil alleged that U.S. cotton 
 
 79. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the 
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 6.3 
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, DSR 2000:V, 2243 (Mar. 24, 2000).  
 80. SHADIKHODJAEV, supra note 76, at 28–29. 
 81. Id. at 95. 
 82. Id. at 95–96; see also WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY 
ROUND AGREEMENTS 96 (Kluwer Law Int’l ed., 1999).   
 83. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 27, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 42 [hereinafter SCM Agreement] (“Members 
recognize that subsidies may play an important role in economic development 
programmes of developing country Members”). 
 84. DSU, supra note 69, at arts. 3.12. &12.10; see also SHADIKHODJAEV, 
supra note 76 ,  at 95 
 85. Panel Report, U.S. – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, at 2-3, WT/DS267/R 
(Sept. 8, 2004) (requesting the DSB panel to rule that U.S. subsidies had 
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subsidies significantly suppress prices of cotton internationally, 
causing significant losses to Brazil’s cotton industry.
86
 
The WTO arbitrator ruled largely in Brazil’s favor finding 
that the U.S. had violated its obligations under Article 6.3 of 
the SCM Agreement. Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement states: 
 
Serious prejudice . . . may arise in any case where one 
or several of the following apply: (a) the effect of the 
subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like 
product of another Member into the market of the 
subsidizing Member; (b) the effect of the subsidy is to 
displace or impede the exports of a like product of 
another Member from a third country market; (c) the 
effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting 
by the subsidized product as compared with the price 
of a like product of another Member in the same 
market or significant price suppression, price 
depression or lost sales in the same market; (d) the 
effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world 
market share of the subsidizing Member in a 
particular subsidized primary product or commodity 
as compared to the average share it had during the 
previous period of three years and this increase 
follows a consistent trend over a period when 
subsidies have been granted.
87
 
 
The WTO arbitration panel found that, based on an 
economic analysis, U.S. counter-cyclical cotton subsidies 
suppressed international prices by $2.9 billion each year.
88
 In 
order to enforce the ruling, the WTO allowed Brazil to enact 
retaliatory trade measures against the U.S. until the U.S. 
either ended the counter-cyclical and marketing loan programs 
or remedied the prejudicial price suppression on all affected 
countries, not just Brazil.
89
 However, the panel only allowed 
Brazil to enact trade measures in the amount that the U.S. 
 
suppressed cotton prices in U.S., Brazil and world markets, thereby violating 
SCM Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c)). 
 86. Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter ABR Cotton]. 
 87. SCM Agreement, supra note 83, at art. 5 (stating that WTO members 
may not use subsidies that cause prejudice to the domestic industry of another 
member). 
 88. See ABR Cotton, supra note 86. 
 89. See id. 
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cotton subsidies affected Brazil’s cotton prices, not global cotton 
prices. The U.S. subsidies affected global cotton prices in the 
amount of $147.3 million.
90
  
The Brazil–U.S. cotton dispute set an important legal 
precedent for future challenges in the WTO’s dispute 
settlement process. First, the arbitration panel ruled that price 
suppression suffices to establish a violation of the SCM 
agreement.
91
 Second, the panel used an economic analysis to 
quantify that prejudice in financial terms, which provides a 
basis for remedies.
92
 Third, the WTO allowed Brazil to enact 
retaliatory measures against the U.S. in the amount that the 
U.S. cotton subsidies affected Brazil’s cotton industry. It also 
allowed them to continue those measures until the U.S. aligned 
its subsidies program with WTO regulations.
93
 The WTO’s 
arbitration ruling on the U.S. cotton subsidies provides a 
blueprint for other countries initiating challenges against 
countries that violate WTO subsidy regulations.
94
 In 2007, both 
Canada and Brazil initiated dispute settlement proceedings 
against the U.S. regarding its prejudicial subsidies.
95
 Both 
countries, however, have agreed to postpone proceedings 
pending further WTO trade negotiations.
96
 
The Cotton decision provides a legal precedent for 
countries that successfully challenge a prejudicial subsidy to 
retaliate with trade measures until the respondent country 
remedies the prejudicial effect or eliminates the prejudicial 
subsidies. However, the remaining question is whether these 
measures are sufficient to incentivize smaller developing 
countries to use the dispute settlement system. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
While the WTO has made significant strides in creating a 
judicial system that is more easily accessible to developing 
 
 90. See id. 
 91. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 6. 
 92. Id. at 4. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 6. 
 95. See generally RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34351, 
BRAZIL’S AND CANADA’S WTO CASES AGAINST U.S. AGRICULTURAL DIRECT 
PAYMENTS (2010) (detailing the legal arguments made by Canada and Brazil 
against direct payment subsidies and the possible political and policy 
ramification for Congress). 
 96. Id. at 1.  
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countries, it has yet to provide sufficient access to smaller 
developing countries. Moreover, access is irrelevant if smaller 
developing countries fail to use the system. The WTO therefore 
needs also to provide sufficient incentives in the form of 
remedies for smaller developing countries to encourage them to 
use the WTO dispute resolution system. 
While the WTO has allowed Brazil to enact $147.3 million 
of retaliatory trade measures against the U.S., the U.S. has yet 
to repeal either the marketing loan program subsidy or the 
counter-cyclical subsidy.
97
 In 2007, Brazil filed an additional 
complaint in the WTO system over other U.S. domestic subsidy 
policies in frustration over the lack of cotton subsidy reforms by 
the U.S.
98
 Policy reform, however, is still a work in progress. 
The U.S. Senate has passed the Agriculture Reform, Food and 
Jobs Act of 2012, which must now pass the House of 
Representatives.
99
 The legislation proposes to end counter-
cyclical subsidies, direct payment subsidies and alter the 
marketing loan program. This initiative would rein in 
prejudicial subsidies and would comply with the WTO’s 
decision.
100
 However, there has been strong opposition to the 
bill. Whether it will pass the House  remains unanswered.
101
 
Unable to resolve issues with the bill, Congress allowed the 
previous farm bill to expire on September 30, 2012.
102
  
 
 97. See ABR Cotton, supra note 86. 
 98. See generally SCHNEPF RL34351, supra note 95. 
 99. Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2012, S. Res. 3240, 112th 
Cong, (2012). 
 100. See id. 
 101. Brandon Arnold & Sallie James, Plenty of Blame to Go Around on 
Farm Bill Travesty, THE CATO INSTITUTE (Nov. 14, 2002, 2:47 PM), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/plenty-blame-go-around-farm-
bill-travesty (“[T]he top House Republican, Rep. John Boehner (Ohio), has 
openly stated his opposition to the farm bill. ‘The [legislation] . . . extends 
flawed policies that keep American farmers dependent on government 
subsidies and discourage other countries from opening their markets to 
American farm export,’ he noted in a May 13 letter to a colleague. ‘This 
approach doesn't help American farmers — it hurts them. We shouldn't 
support it.’”); see also Keith Collins & Harun Bulut, Crop Insurance and the 
Future Farm Safety Net, 26 CHOICES: THE MAGAZINE OF FOOD, FARM AND 
RESOURCE ISSUES 1, 3 (2011), http://www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-
magazine/submitted-articles/crop-insurance-and-the-future-farm-safety-net 
(“Sharp cuts in premium subsidies, delivery cost payments to companies, and 
Federal reinsurance would likely generate significant opposition from 
producers, companies, and farm suppliers.”). 
 102. Marni Salmon, Food Fight: A Case Study of the Community Food 
Security Coalition’s Campaign for a Fair Farm Bill, CAPSTONE COLLECTION 9 
(July 2012) (M.A. thesis, SIT Institute) (“The Food, Conservation and Energy 
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While retaliatory trade measures incentivize developed 
countries to reform policies when the measures come from a 
country like Brazil with significant economic power, these 
measures have less influence when instituted by countries with 
a smaller economy.
103
 Brazil has the seventh largest GDP in the 
world at $2.32 trillion annually.
104
 If a country with such 
economic clout has had trouble convincing the U.S. to change 
its domestic subsidy policies, how would a country like Nigeria 
fare with an annual GDP of roughly $418 billion?
105
 Nigeria is 
not even one of the world’s least developing countries (LDC), 
which have barely taken advantage of the WTO dispute 
system.
106
 The WTO must find some way to balance the 
economic power gap between larger developing countries, like 
Brazil, and smaller developing countries, like Nigeria. 
Although the WTO initiated the DSU with the intention of 
encouraging use of the dispute settlement system for smaller 
developing countries,
107
 it has largely failed in that goal. 
Developing countries have used the WTO dispute settlement 
system more than the GATT system,
108
 but the statistics on 
access for developing countries are misleading. While 40% of 
the complaints filed in the dispute system have been from 
developing countries, only five countries account for 60% of 
 
Act of 2008, more commonly known as the 2008 Farm Bill, expires on 
September 30, 2012.”). 
 103. Kristin Bohl, Problems of Developing Country Access to WTO Dispute 
Settlement,  9 CHI.-KENT J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 130, 131–32 (2009)  
 104. CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications 
/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
 105. Id.  
 106. Bangladesh is the only least-developed country to initiate dispute 
settlement proceedings in India – Anti-Dumping Measure on Batteries from 
Bangladesh, WT/DS306/1 (Feb. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Measure]. 
 107. Bohl, supra note 103, at 133 (“The WTO negotiators plainly intended 
to encourage developing countries to use the system, as demonstrated by 
‘special and differential treatment’ provisions laid out across the various WTO 
agreements. These provisions specifically deviate from the general rules, and 
they provide special rights ‘which give developed countries the possibility to 
treat developing countries more favorably than other WTO Members.’ The text 
of the DSU alone contains at least eleven such provisions by which developing 
countries should enjoy.”); see also DSU, supra note 69, at art. 21.2 ( “Particular 
attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing 
country Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute 
settlement.”); Bohl, supra note 103, at 32 fn.8. 
 108. See generally Bohl, supra note 103, at 131–33 (noting that larger 
developing countries have made greater use of the dispute settlement system 
in recent years). 
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those complaints. Thirteen countries account for 90% of them.
109
 
In fact, no country in Africa or in the Middle East has ever 
initiated a complaint in the WTO dispute system.
110
 Currently, 
ninety-five of the WTO’s 120 non-OECD countries have never 
filed a complaint before the WTO.
111
 Only one least-developed 
country has ever filed a WTO complaint.
112
 As it stands, the 
WTO dispute system principally benefits the most economically 
powerful countries.
113
  
This problem exists for two overarching reasons: access 
and incentive. First, smaller developing countries do not have 
the same access to the WTO’s dispute settlement system.
114
 
Second, the remedies that the WTO offers to successful 
claimants do not incentivize smaller developing countries to 
initiate timely and costly dispute settlement proceedings 
against developed countries.
115
 The problem of access has been 
extensively addressed above. The second problem is a more 
novel concept and becomes more relevant in light of the recent 
Cotton decision. 
 
A. IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEM 
 
Before discussing the issues of developing countries’ access 
to and incentive to use the WTO’s dispute settlement system, 
this Note addresses why access to the system is important. 
First, access to the WTO dispute system has generally worked 
 
 109. Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System: Why it Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES 
AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT, at 167, 177 (Frontiers of Econ. & 
Globalization vol. 6, 2009). 
 110. Id. This point is especially egregious, because African countries have 
the largest potential for agricultural growth, and are definitely affected. See 
generally World Bank, Agriculture: Value Added (Annual % Growth), DATA, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.KD.ZG (last visited Nov. 4, 
2012) (providing each country’s annual growth rate for agricultural value 
added). 
 111. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 177. 
 112. See generally Anti-Dumping Measure, supra note 106. 
 113. See, e.g., Bohl, supra note 103, at 131–32 
 114. See Shaffer, supra note 109; see also Obijiofor Aginam, Food Safety, 
South-North Asymmetries, and the Clash of Regulatory Regimes, 40 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1099 (2007); Bohl, supra note 103. 
 115. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 182. 
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for larger countries.
116
 Three years after favorable adjudication 
by the WTO regarding the complainant’s affected goods, the 
complainants’ exports of the affected goods to the respondent 
countries increased substantially.
117
 Successful claimants have 
used the WTO system to balance regulations affecting 
international trade and have increased their market access, 
which is essential for developing countries.
118
 However, the 
successful claimants have generally been economically powerful 
countries. 
Secondly, WTO jurisprudence not only affects the 
participating countries in dispute settlement, but shapes the 
perceptions of international trade law.
119
 Just as with the U.S. 
legislation, when Congress leaves its interpretation and 
application to the court system, so too do international 
agreements require interpretation by a judicial body. Neither 
the legislation nor the judicial system can foresee every 
circumstance.
120
 The WTO dispute system serves this function, 
but fails to do so if smaller developing countries do not use the 
system, leaving prejudicial policies unchallenged. Furthermore, 
when countries use the dispute system, it provides both 
precedent and guidelines for other countries in similar 
disputes.
121
 This point is illustrated by in the Cotton case. Now 
that Brazil has navigated the complexities of challenging a 
domestic subsidy, other countries can use similar tools as a 
blueprint for successful challenges.
122
  The WTO panel used a 
number of novel approaches in determining the prejudicial 
effect of U.S. cotton subsidies on the international cotton 
market, including economic models to prove price 
suppression.
123
 The panel also determined that subsidies can 
 
 116. Id. at 169–70; see also David Evans & Gregory C. Shaffer, Conclusion, 
in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO: THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
EXPERIENCE 342, 342–43 (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz eds., 
2010). 
 117. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 171 (citing Chad Bown, On the Economic 
Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 811 
(2004)). 
 118. Id. at 170. 
 119. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 172. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 6. 
 122. See id. at 5. (“[I]t will be considerably easier for future complaining 
party litigants to plan and prosecute successfully their serious prejudice 
challenges because of the lessons learned from the Cotton decisions.”). 
 123. Id .at 6 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he Arbitrators confirmed the viability 
and utility of particular types of econometric models to assess the effects of 
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substantially prejudice a well-functioning international market 
by significantly suppressing prices and that this can be 
demonstrated causally.
124
 Both Canada and Brazil have 
initiated WTO disputes against the U.S. regarding its domestic 
subsidy policies.
125
 The findings in the Cotton decision will 
provide significant guidance for these countries in their 
disputes.
126
 
Third, a failure to participate in the WTO dispute system 
allows prejudicial subsidies to continue unchecked.
127
 Price 
suppressing subsidies force developing countries’ farmers to 
produce and export more commodities to keep up with the 
international market, which has a detrimental effect on the 
social welfare of a country.
128
 By successfully challenging these 
prejudicial subsidies, countries can remove these effects, 
resulting in the improvement of both their agricultural sector 
and the social welfare of their country.
129
 
Lastly, WTO law can affect domestic and bilateral political 
negotiations.
130
 WTO retaliatory measures force governments to 
consider how costly their protective policies are in light of those 
retaliatory trade measures.
131
 For example, after $147.3 million 
of Brazilian trade retaliation, the U.S. will have to consider the 
economic and political ramifications of continuing their cotton 
subsidies.
132
 While it may not unilaterally change domestic 
policies, it will be a significant future consideration.
133
  
 
subsidies . . . . The use of such models is crucial given the counterfactual 
nature of the entire serious prejudice question, i.e. whether, but for the 
subsidies, world prices would have been higher. Future complaining parties 
can adopt and adapt as necessary these models in preparing future challenges. 
This will significantly facilitate the defense of such models.”). 
 124. Id. at 5–6. 
 125. See generally RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33853, 
CANADA CORN TRADE DISPUTE (2007) (explaining Canada’s legal dispute 
against U.S. corn subsidies and noting possible policy ramification if the 
dispute should succeed). 
 126. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 6. 
 127. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 171. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 172. 
 131. Cf. Robert W. Staiger & Guido Tabellini, Do GATT rules help 
governments make domestic commitments?, 11 ECON. & POL. 109 (1999) 
(showing that the GATT and WTO rules, including possible retaliations from 
trading partners in response to the violation of the rules, have influence on 
governments’ trade policies). 
 132. See SCHNEPF RL 33853, supra note 125, at 11. 
 133. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 173–74; see also Marc Busch & Eric 
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Regarding bilateral negotiations, the WTO case law 
significantly affects future decisions since the case law is not as 
developed as the U.S. common law.
134
 Because WTO rulings can 
significantly affect future decisions, the most frequent 
complainants can shape the law, thus tipping the scales of 
international trade law in their favor.
135
 This becomes a distinct 
advantage in negotiations following a judicial decision by the 
WTO, because policies are generally changed through political 
negotiations informed by the decision, rather than an 
enforcement mechanism by the WTO (the Cotton dispute is an 
exception).
136
 Therefore, developed countries that use the WTO 
dispute settlement system much more frequently garner a 
significant political advantage over smaller developed countries 
that rarely use the system.
137
 For these reasons, in order to 
sufficiently represent the interests of smaller developing 
countries, the WTO must increase their access to dispute 
settlement. 
 
B. PRINCIPAL OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ 
ACCESS TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
In order to determine how to increase smaller developing 
countries’ access to WTO dispute resolution, we must assess 
the obstacles to their access. There are several factors that 
affect smaller developing countries’ failure to use the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system. One of the most prohibitive factors 
is the cost of litigation.
138
 In Chile – Price Band System and 
Safeguard Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products, 
filed by Argentina in 2000, the Association of Argentine Edible 
Oil Industries paid approximately $400,000 to a law firm just 
for the first draft of a demand.
139
 Other countries willingly pay 
 
Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in 
GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158 (showing that GATT/WTO 
adverse rulings, despite their lack of enforcement power, have induced 
settlements between future parties.). 
 134. See generally Shaffer, supra note 109, at 168–69 (discussing the 
development of international trade case law). 
 135. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 173–74. 
 136. Id. at 174. 
 137. Id. at 173. 
 138. See, e.g., Bohl, supra note 103 , at 144–51; Shaffer, supra note 109, at 
183–85. 
 139. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 183 (citing Diana Tussie & Valentina 
Delich, The Political Economy of Dispute Settlement: A Case from Argentina, 
Latin Am. Trade Network, Working Paper No. 33, 2004). 
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much more in legal fees. In the U.S.-EC Boeing Airbus dispute, 
legal fees ran up to approximately $1 million per month.
140
 
Specifically regarding agricultural subsidies in the Cotton 
dispute, Brazil’s cotton trade association paid roughly $2 
million in legal fees.
141
 Providing sufficient evidence to prove a 
link between U.S. domestic policy and international price 
suppression required extremely resource intensive measures, 
including statistical analyses and quantifiable economic data.
142
 
Brazil can more easily pay these fees with its annual GDP of 
$2.32 trillion, but a country like Uganda, whose annual GDP is 
roughly $17 billion, will struggle to cover that cost.
143
 The costs 
associated with complex dispute settlement proceedings 
provide a significant barrier to developing country access.
144
 
The WTO has made strides in this area by allowing 
developing countries to participate in the WTO litigation at a 
subsidized rate through the Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
(ACWL).
145
 Each member country contributes to the ACWL, 
which then charges developing countries with an “economy in 
transition” at various rates. The rates depend on the countries’ 
size and ability to pay.
146
 The Center also provides free legal 
advice on WTO law.
147
 Moreover, it places special emphasis on 
the least-developed countries by automatically granting those 
countries access to its services.
148
 The ACWL has had relative 
success thus far in the dispute system. From 2001 to 2008, it 
had provided support in thirty-seven dispute settlement 
proceedings, which constituted over 20% of the proceedings 
during that time.
149
 With an emphasis on increasing 
participation by developing countries, the ACWL constitutes a 
significant step towards a more equitable judicial system in the 
 
 140. Id. at 184. 
 141. Id. at 183. 
 142. See generally Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37. 
 143. CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications 
/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
 144. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 184–85. 
 145. See Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre On WTO Law, Nov. 
30, 1999, 2299 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter ACWL Agreement]; see also Shaffer, 
supra note 109, at 184 (“The Advisory Centre on WTO Law enables developing 
countries to participate at subsidized rates and has represented an important 
development for the system.”). But see Bohl, supra note 103, at 146–47. 
 146. ACWL Agreement, supra note 145, annex IV (explaining the various 
rates charged for different services). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 347. 
 149. Id.  
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WTO.
150
 
However, the prohibitive cost of litigation represents only 
the threshold of issues restricting smaller developing countries’ 
access to the WTO dispute system. Even at subsidized rates, a 
country must have the legal resources and sophistication to 
engage in complex and costly litigation.
151
 Even if a country had 
the necessary funds to pay the legal costs, countries with weak 
infrastructure lack the capacity to develop a factually sufficient 
case and provide the necessary support to a law firm to manage 
a case.
152
 This rings especially true in factually intensive cases 
like the Cotton dispute, which required extensive economic 
analysis of the effects of U.S. cotton subsidies on the 
international market.
153
 Performing such an analysis requires 
expert witness research and testimony. Smaller developing 
countries may not have the infrastructure to provide the WTO 
Advisory Centre with the necessary information to perform 
such analyses.
154
 Furthermore, both extensive research and an 
administrative infrastructure are required to detect such 
prejudicial effects. Many governments of developing countries 
do not have the institutional capacity to investigate how foreign 
subsidies affect domestic industries, especially when there are 
more pressing domestic issues.
155
  
Moreover, there is a wide gap in the relative stakes in 
WTO litigation between a developed country and a smaller 
developing country.
156
 A prejudicial subsidy could affect a 
country like Nigeria as much as Brazil, but the relative stakes 
for Brazil are much higher because of its economic size. Thus, 
due to the aggregate stakes, the nature of the WTO system 
does more to encourage economically powerful countries to 
initiate disputes than those less powerful.
157
 In a study of U.S.–
EC trade disputes, Marc Busch and Eric Reihardt ranked 
 
 150. See id.; see also Bohl, supra note 103, at 188 
 151. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 184. 
 152. See Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 344. 
 153. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 6. 
 154. See Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 344. 
 155. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 184 (“[A] poor country must consider 
the greater opportunity costs confronting it on account of its scarce 
resources.”).  
 156. See Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 343 (citing Hagan Nordstrom 
& Gregory Shaffer, Access to Justice in the World Trade Organization: The 
Case for a Small Claims Procedure: A Preliminary Analysis, 7 WORLD TRADE 
REV. 587 (2008)). 
 157. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 182. 
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disputes that involved an excess of $150 million in annual 
trade as a high stakes dispute.
158
 However, $150 million “only 
represented about .0015% of U.S. gross domestic product at 
that time (2001). A claim of comparable importance for 
Honduras would equal around $255,000.”
159
 A high stakes 
dispute for a country like Honduras, which is not even 
considered a least-developed country, is much lower than a 
high stakes dispute for a larger country.
160
 “[A] million dollars 
in foregone export revenue may not matter much for the 
European Union or the U.S.; it would only be a few seconds’ 
worth of exports. Yet for small developing countries like 
Burundi, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, one million dollars 
corresponds to about 1.45% of annual exports . . . .”
161
 It is, 
therefore, difficult for a smaller developing country to bring a 
claim of significance against a developed country like the U.S. 
The WTO needs to create solutions for overcoming this gap in 
economic power.  
Smaller developing countries must also consider the 
opportunity cost in pursuing dispute settlement. When legal 
fees could cost an excess of several million dollars, a country 
must evaluate whether the harm to its own agricultural market 
justifies incurring the expense of litigation.
162
 In the Cotton 
dispute, the WTO panel found that U.S. cotton subsidies had 
cost the Brazilian cotton industry roughly $147.3 million, which 
arguably justifies the $2 million it paid in legal fees. A much 
smaller developing country, however, may suffer a 
proportionately equal harm, but because of its significantly 
smaller cotton industry and GDP, U.S. subsidies would harm it 
significantly less than $147.3 million. Nonetheless, the costs 
associated with litigating the claim are the same for a smaller 
developing country as for Brazil (notwithstanding subsidized 
measures by the ACWLO) This lesser remedy-same cost 
dynamic reduces the potential reward for a developing country 
from dispute settlement proceedings. Bown elaborates on this 
point when he states, “The formal evidence indicates that, 
despite market access interests in a dispute, an exporting 
 
 158. See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES: 
THE EU, THE US, AND THE WTO 465, 475 (Ernst-Uhlrich Petersmann & Mark 
A. Pollack eds., 2003). 
 159. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 182. 
 160. Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 343. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 5. 
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country is less likely to participate in WTO litigation if it has 
inadequate power for trade retaliation . . . ,” which is a 
characteristic “typically associated with developing 
countries . . . .”
163
 A smaller developing country must then 
evaluate whether it is worth spending several million dollars to 
litigate a case in front of the WTO, which may take several 
years,
164
 or whether it should instead import the subsidized 
crop at lower costs and allow its own agricultural market to 
suffer.
165
  
Countries must also consider the political ramifications of 
initiating a dispute against a more powerful country. The WTO 
prohibits any non-authorized, unilateral retaliation between 
countries.
166
 Under the authority of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, 
however, the U.S. has in several instances enacted retaliatory 
trade measures against a country prior to the dispute 
settlement body’s authorization of those measures.
167
 The 
European Community initiated dispute settlement proceedings 
against the U.S. after U.S. efforts to retaliate against the 
European Community’s banana regime.
168
 Despite its 
prohibition on non-authorized trade measures, the WTO ruled 
in favor of the provisions in the U.S. Trade Act that allowed for 
retaliation prior to authorization by the dispute settlement 
body. It stipulated, however, that the U.S. “exercise[d] the 
discretion given to it by the statutory language in a way 
consistent WTO obligations.”
169
 Furthermore, the U.S. – Section 
301 Trade Act did not resolve the question of whether a country 
can threaten to retaliate against a country prior to the 
resolution of a trade issue by the dispute settlement body.
170
 
Korea has identified a list of retaliatory measures itemizing 
target goods published by the U.S.
171
 Political retaliation thus 
remains a consideration for smaller developing countries in 
 
 163. Chad Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, 
Interested Parties, and Free Riders, 19 THE WORLD BANK ECON. REVIEW 287, 
308 (2005). 
 164. Id. at 309. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Panel Report, U.S.–Import Measures on Certain Products from the 
European Communities, ¶ 6.38, WT/DS165/R (July 17, 2000). 
 167. See SHADIKHODJAEV, supra note 76, at 36–37. 
 168. U.S.–Import Measures on Certain Products from the European 
Communities, supra note 166. 
 169. Panel Report, U.S.–Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.117, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].  
 170. SHADIKHODJAEV, supra note 76, at 38. 
 171. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 169, ¶ 5.309. 
OLSON Article 2/25/2014  10:13 AM 
126 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 23:1 
 
initiating WTO dispute resolution.  
Political ramifications, however, do not end at retaliatory 
measures. Another political consideration for developing 
countries is the potential effect that dispute settlement 
proceedings may have on future trade negotiations with the 
respondent country: “If a developing country government fears 
that by bringing a dispute to the WTO it will jeopardize the 
stability of its trading relationships, it is unlikely the 
government will move forward.”
172
 Trade relationships are 
delicately formed. Trade disputes under an international body 
can disrupt those relationships, which may lead some 
developing countries to be reluctant to initiate disputes.
173
 This 
reality is especially true when the developing country relies on 
the potential respondent for development assistance and global 
aid initiatives.
174
  
For example, if Nigeria initiates a suit against the U.S. for 
prejudicial subsidies on sorghum, it has to consider how much 
it relies on U.S. imports for its own economy.
175
 In 2011, Nigeria 
imported $4.8 billion of U.S. goods, including cereals ($1.2 
billion), vehicles ($1.1 billion), machinery ($720 million), 
mineral fuel ($597 million) and plastic ($187 million).
176
 Each 
one of these imports amounts to more than the amount of 
retaliatory trade measures the WTO allowed Brazil to enact 
against the U.S. and would be much larger than any prejudicial 
effects U.S. sorghum subsidies would have on Nigeria. Beyond 
reliance on U.S. imports, Nigeria also significantly relies on 
U.S. foreign aid.
177
 In 2008, the U.S. estimated giving 
approximately $490 million in foreign aid for “increasing 
stability through improved social sector service delivery, 
particularly through HIV/AIDS programs; fostering 
transparent and accountable governance; promoting a more 
market-led economy; and enhancing Nigeria’s capacity as a 
responsible regional and trade partner.”
178
 If Nigeria were to 
initiate a suit against the U.S., it would have to consider the 
 
 172. Bohl, supra note 103, at 163. 
 173. Id. at 163. 
 174. Id. at 164–65. 
 175. Nigeria, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2012). 
 176. Id.  
 177. FOREIGN OPERATIONS, CONG. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 286 (2009), 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/101368.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
 178. Id.  
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possible chilling effect on future trade negotiations with the 
U.S. Combined with the financial commitment required to 
successfully argue a case before the WTO, developing countries 
may be reluctant to initiate such a dispute. 
These obstacles to accessing the WTO dispute settlement 
system have prevented many developing countries from taking 
advantage of the system, especially smaller developing 
countries. While Brazil, India and China have used the system 
extensively, they are also three of the world’s largest 
economies. Due to a lack of legal and financial resources, weak 
infrastructure, and lack of economic and political clout, smaller 
developing countries have not been able to maximize the 
benefits of the system. However, access to the dispute system is 
not the only impediment preventing these countries from 
initiating disputes. 
 
C. RETALIATORY MEASURES PERMITTED IN THE COTTON 
DISPUTE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO INCENTIVIZE SMALLER 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO USE THE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
 
The previous issues detail lack of access to the dispute 
settlement system for smaller developing countries. However, 
access to the system is only a threshold issue. Once these 
countries have access to the dispute system, there must be 
adequate incentives to use the system. Even if a country like 
Nigeria has sufficient access to the dispute settlement system, 
the system will not help Nigeria unless the country actually 
initiates disputes.
179
 The WTO, therefore, also needs to offer 
sufficient incentives for smaller developing countries to use the 
dispute settlement system.
 180
 
Undermining the incentive to use the dispute settlement 
system is the lack of a reward that would justify the high costs 
of participation. Brazil spent roughly $2 million and six years 
to effectively litigate against the U.S. over its prejudicial cotton 
subsidies. It has been three years since the WTO allowed Brazil 
to enact millions of dollars of retaliatory trade measures 
against the U.S. Yet there has been no change in U.S. domestic 
policy regarding subsidies.
181
 The Agricultural Reform, Food 
 
 179. See Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 342.  
 180. See id.  
 181. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 1. 
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and Jobs Act of 2012 proposed to eliminate the bill has been 
met with significant opposition not only regarding the 
elimination of subsidies, but also the bill’s proposal to increase 
federal spending by a significant amount.
182
 If the remedies are 
inadequate to cure the problem, a smaller developing country 
would have difficulty justifying spending several years and 
millions of dollars litigating a case before the WTO and risking 
political alienation from a much more powerful country like the 
U.S. If the $147.3 million in retaliatory trade measures are 
insufficient to alter U.S. domestic policy, what chance does a 
smaller developing country have?
183
 Without significant reform 
of the WTO’s remedies, the prohibitive cost (both financially 
and politically) and the minimal reward will prevent 
developing countries from taking advantage of the WTO’s 
dispute system. 
 
D. THE WTO SHOULD ALLOW COMPLAINANTS TO ENACT 
RETALIATORY MEASURES IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT THAT 
PREJUDICIAL SUBSIDIES SUPPRESS INTERNATIONAL 
PRICES 
 
Policy officials cannot create a solution for every obstacle to 
access for developing countries. There will always be political 
risk for developing countries initiating disputes against more 
powerful countries. However, while there is no silver bullet 
solution to the problems of access and incentive for developing 
countries, there are opportunities for reform in the dispute 
settlement system that would provide a greater incentive to 
countries with smaller economies to initiate disputes. 
Primarily, the WTO needs to make remedies for successful 
claimants significant enough to justify the financial and 
resource investment that countries have to make in complex 
WTO litigation.
184
 In the Cotton dispute, the remedies that the 
arbitration panel provided set an insufficient precedent for 
developing countries trying to take action against prejudicial 
agricultural subsidies.
185
 Brazil argued it should have been able 
 
 182. Arnold & James, supra note 101. 
 183. See Bown, supra note 163, at 827 (“Our formal evidence indicates that, 
despite market access interests in a dispute, an exporting country is less likely 
to participate in WTO litigation if it has inadequate power for trade 
retaliation”). 
 184. Id.  
 185. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 5. 
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to enact retaliatory measures in excess of $1 billion, because 
U.S. cotton subsidies had suppressed international cotton 
prices by roughly $2.9 billion each year.
186
 However, the court 
determined that Brazil could only suspend concession in 
proportion with its market share, which at the time was 
roughly 5%.
187
 Therefore, the court only allowed Brazil to enact 
measures up to a total of $147.3 million per year.
188
 While this 
number is not insignificant and could ultimately cause the U.S. 
to eliminate its prejudicial subsidies, it does not encourage 
smaller developing countries to initiate a dispute. In 2011, 
Brazil was the world’s fifth largest producer of cotton, 
producing 8,700 bales of cotton.
189
 If a country like Nigeria, 
which is the nineteenth largest producer of cotton, producing 
325 bales of cotton in 2011
190
, were to enact retaliatory 
measures against the U.S., the measures would not likely 
induce the U.S. to change its policies. Expanding the 
retaliatory measures (to account for the total amount of price 
suppression caused by market-distorting subsidies) would 
provide smaller developing countries a much greater incentive 
to initiate dispute settlement proceedings, because the size of 
their economy would not serve as a cap on the amount of their 
damage claims. 
Some might argue that countries can join litigation as a 
third party and receive remedy accordingly. Article 10 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding allows for third parties to 
join a dispute if they have a substantial interest in the matter 
and have notified the dispute settlement body.
191
 Critics may 
argue that this provision sufficiently protects the interests of 
smaller developing countries. For example, if U.S. sorghum 
subsidies prejudice a country like Nigeria, Nigeria can join 
several other countries in a dispute against the U.S. for 
violation of its obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture 
 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  
 189. Crop Data, NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA, 
http://www.cotton.org/econ/cropinfo/cropdata/rankings.cfm (select “2008”; then 
select “Production”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
 190. Id. 
 191. DSU, supra note 69, at art. 10(2) (“Any Member having a substantial 
interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the 
DSB . . . shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make 
written submissions to the panel. These submissions shall also be given to the 
parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the panel report.”); see also 
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS , supra note 72, at 109–10. 
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and the SCM Agreement. 
In some instances, this approach has been successful. Most 
notably, the European Union and ten Latin American nations 
just recently settled a long-standing dispute regarding EU 
tariffs on banana imports.
192
 Costa Rica originally filed the 
complaint in 1991, but soon Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela 
joined as well.
193
 While Costa Rica alone could not induce the 
EU into negotiating for a reduction in banana import tariffs, 
the collective economic power of ten Latin American countries 
eventually compelled this result.
194
 Critics of more stringent 
retaliatory measures might point to this dispute as an example 
of how the dispute settlement system sufficiently protects the 
interests of smaller developing countries. 
There are several issues, however, with such a proposition. 
First, there is little incentive for a country to join in litigation 
when a larger country has already taken on the task because 
the damages sought are not financial damages, but rather a 
removal of prejudicial subsidies by the respondent party. For 
example, in U.S. - Safeguard on Circular Welded Pipe from 
Korea, which concerned the U.S.’s  implementation of a WTO-
inconsistent protectionist policy, Korea sought an elimination 
of the trade barrier as a remedy.
195
 No financial damages were 
sought. In this instance, several other countries and regional 
entities did participate in the dispute, such as Japan and the 
EU.
196
 However, as Bown states:  
 
[O]ther adversely affected exporting countries, such as 
South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela, did not formally 
participate in the dispute. Undoubtedly they hoped to 
free ride and enjoy market access benefits generated 
by the formal litigants’ efforts to liberalize the 
safeguard-protected market . . . as WTO rules 
 
 192. Garry White, Banana Prices Set to Fall After 20-year Tariffs 'War’ 
Ends, THE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance 
/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/9667773/Banana-prices-set-to-fall-after-20-
year-tariffs-war-ends.html. 
 193. Press Release, General Pascal Lamy, Former WTO Director, Lamy 
Hails Accord Ending Long Running Banana Dispute (Dec. 15, 2009). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, U.S. – 
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Wire Rod and Circular 
Welded Quality Line Pipe, WT/DS214/1 (Dec. 7, 2000). 
 196. Bown, supra note 163, at 813. 
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require.
197
 
 
Similarly, Nigeria did not have to file written submissions 
to the WTO in the Cotton dispute, because its interests were 
already protected. Therefore, Nigeria would not have benefitted 
from  joining in the Cotton dispute, even if it were adversely 
affected by U.S. cotton subsidies. Simply, they could achieve 
the same result by not joining the dispute and risking political 
alienation. 
While in the above example Nigeria would still have its 
trade interests protected and, therefore, would not need further 
access to the dispute system, other situations could arise in 
which its interests would not be sufficiently protected. The 
WTO cannot expect smaller developing countries to 
continuously rely on larger countries to take up the banner for 
them in settlement proceedings. Policy shortcomings aside, 
while such an approach may work with certain crops that both 
larger and smaller developing countries rely on, such as cotton 
or corn, it could achieve undesirable results with other crops. 
For example, the U.S. currently subsidizes sorghum production 
in the same way that it subsidizes cotton production.
198
 In 2008, 
the U.S. issued roughly $314 million of sorghum subsidies to 
U.S. farmers.
199
 The U.S. is the world’s leading sorghum 
producer, producing roughly 12 million tons of sorghum in 
2008, which equals approximately 18.04% of the world’s market 
share.
200
 The next leading producer is Nigeria, producing 
roughly 9 million tons of sorghum in 2008, equaling roughly 
14.04% of the world’s market share.
201
 The next leading 
producers in 2008 were India, Mexico and (former) Sudan, with 
11.95, 9.96 and 5.83% of the market share, respectively.
202
 With 
the largest market share outside the U.S., Nigeria likely cannot 
 
  197.    Id.  
 198. 7 U.S.C. §§ 8702, 8713, 8714 (2008). 
 199. The United States Summary Information, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING 
GROUP FARM SUBSIDIES, http://farm.ewg.org/region.php?fips=00000&progcode 
=total&yr=2008 (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
 200. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT, 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/ 567/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=567#ancor (under 
“country”  select “United States of America,” “Nigeria,” “India,” “Mexico,” and 
“Sudan (former)”; under “element” select “Production Capacity”; under “year” 
select “2008”; under “item” select “sorghum” click “show data”) (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2012). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. 
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rely on a larger developing country to initiate a dispute against 
the U.S. Because the world sorghum market is substantially 
smaller than the world cotton market,
203
 the amount that 
Nigeria would theoretically be allowed to enact in retaliatory 
trade measures against the U.S. would be substantially smaller 
than the amount that Brazil was allowed to enact in the Cotton 
dispute. While the exact price suppression would have to be 
calculated through economic analyses, it is unlikely that such 
an amount would be sufficient for the U.S. to alter its domestic 
policy. Reliance on economically powerful countries may, in 
some instances, protect the interests of smaller developing 
countries. However, these countries cannot always rely on more 
economically powerful countries to fight their battles for them. 
Furthermore, in order to join as a third-party to a dispute, 
a country must be sufficiently aware of how the dispute affects 
its interest. Developing countries do not necessarily have the 
legal knowledge to assess how a WTO suit will affect their 
interests before the third-party notification requirements. Such 
awareness requires legal resources to identify the nature of the 
dispute and its effect on the country. As noted previously, it is 
presumptuous to expect small developing countries to have the 
legal resources and the administrative infrastructure necessary 
to identify such complaints within the required time frame.  
Lastly, third parties to a dispute cannot make claims of 
their own.
204
 As Palmeter notes, “Third parties cannot make 
claims before a panel, and a complainant cannot rely on them 
to do so on its behalf.”
205
 If an issue arises that is not pursued 
by the original complainant, a third party would have to 
initiate separate proceedings against the respondent.
206
 The 
third party then runs into all the previously discussed issues of 
access and incentive in initiating its own dispute. Furthermore, 
the WTO does not always accept a third party’s request to join 
 
 203. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, in 2008, the total world market production for sorghum was 
66,511,675 tons.  Id.; see also World Cotton Supply and Distribution, USDA 
FOREIGN AGRICULTURE SERVICE, http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdreport. 
aspx?hidReportRetrievalName=BVS&hidReportRetrievalID=856&hidReport 
RetrievalTemplateID=3 (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 204. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS , supra note 72, at 110. 
 205. Id.  
 206. DSU, supra note  69, at art. 10.4 (“[A] measure already the subject of a 
panel proceeding . . . impairs benefits accruing to it under any covered 
agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal dispute settlement 
procedures under this Understanding”). 
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a dispute
207
 when it does not have a substantial enough interest 
in the dispute. In this situation as well, the third party would 
have to file separate proceedings. The third party provisions of 
the current DSU do not provide adequate protections for 
smaller developing countries. 
The WTO should therefore allow a successful claimant to 
enact retaliatory trade measures based on the amount that 
agricultural subsidies suppress prices in the international 
market, not only based on how much those subsidies affect the 
claimant country. Doing so would provide a significantly 
greater incentive to larger countries to alter their trade 
policies. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The WTO has made significant strides in increasing access 
to dispute resolution for developing countries. Its decision in 
the EC-Ecuador banana dispute has induced a negotiated 
agreement to lower banana import tariffs in the EU. In the 
Cotton decision, there is a strong chance that the U.S. will 
comply with the panel’s decision and eliminate counter-cyclical 
and direct payment subsidies. The dispute settlement system 
has provided a significant boon to the creation of equitable 
international trade laws. 
However, larger developing countries, such as India, China 
and Brazil have reaped most of the benefits of this increased 
access to the WTO. In order to truly achieve its goal of 
incorporating the interests of the least-developed countries, the 
WTO must substantially reform its dispute resolution system. 
Primarily, the WTO can overrule its previous decision in the 
Cotton dispute, which only allows retaliatory measures in the 
amount that a country’s domestic subsidies have suppressed 
prices in the claimant’s country. The WTO should further allow 
a country to assume the place of other prejudiced countries and 
retaliate in the amount that the subsidies have suppressed 
global prices, not just within the petitioner’s country. Stricter 
measures would ensure greater compliance by more powerful 
countries and incentivize smaller developing countries to invest 
time, resources and finances in challenging prejudicial 
subsidies. 
 
 207. See, e.g., European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas, supra note 79 (denying Ecuador’s status as a 
third-party petitioner in the dispute). 
